Executive summary

Cyber is the preferred zone for gray-zone competition in 2025. Russia leans on destructive OT-adjacent ops and high-end espionage; China pre-positions quietly inside Western critical infrastructure using “living off the land” (LOTL) tradecraft; Iran mixes state units with hacktivists to coerce & retaliate; North Korea funds its weapons programs via record-breaking crypto heists. Law-enforcement disruption ops, sanctions, and joint advisories are now routine instruments of statecraft and deterrence.

Load-bearing facts (2024–2025)

• PRC’s Volt/Salt Typhoon: multi-year, stealthy pre-positioning across U.S. critical sectors; Five-Eyes+ partners keep issuing joint guidance (and naming Chinese contractors) while DOJ runs botnet clean-ups. CISA+2National Security Agency+2

• Russia (Sandworm/APT29): destructive wipers against Ukraine’s energy sector; simultaneous strategic espionage (e.g., Midnight Blizzard) against Western targets. We Live Security+1

• Iran & proxies: U.S. government warned in June 2025 of likely IR-linked activity against U.S. firms & critical infra; pro-Israel “Predatory Sparrow” hit Iran’s banking/crypto ecosystem—illustrating cyber coercion during kinetic flashpoints. Reuters+2CISA+2

• North Korea: FBI attributes the $1.5B Bybit theft (Feb 2025) to DPRK’s TraderTraitor/Lazarus—state revenue via cybercrime at geopolitical scale. Internet Crime Complaint Center+1

TL;DR — What’s new in 2025

• Pre-positioning over smash-and-grab. PRC activity emphasizes long-term access in comms, energy, transport, and water—explicitly for disruption in crisis. CISA

• OT pressure and wipers. Russia’s Sandworm continues destructive campaigns (e.g., ZEROLOT), keeping energy operators on wartime footing. We Live Security+1

• Cross-domain signaling. Cyber strikes pair with kinetic events (e.g., Iran/Israel crisis), while governments publish joint advisories in near-real time. National Security Agency+1

• Disruption as strategy. DOJ-style botnet deletions (e.g., PlugX) and takedowns are now standard deterrence levers. Department of Justice

Why states hack (and how they signal)

1. Espionage: strategic/political intel; cloud identity abuse; supply-chain access.

2. Coercion & sabotage: OT-adjacent pressure on energy, water, transport; wipers to raise costs. We Live Security

3. Influence & lawfare: information ops timed to elections or crises; sanctions/indictments as counter-signals.

4. Revenue (DPRK): industrial-scale crypto theft as state financing. Internet Crime Complaint Center

Signaling mechanics: Attributions and joint advisories (NSA/CISA/FBI + allies), sanctions lists, public technical detail (TTPs/IOCs), and court-authorized botnet removals now serve as deterrence messaging as much as defense. National Security Agency+1

Campaign archetypes to watch

1) PRC: Pre-positioning for crisis effects

• TTPs: LOTL, valid accounts, edge-device exploitation, long dwell time.

• Targets: comms, energy, transport, water/wastewater; activity stretching years. CISA

• Policy response: joint NSA/CISA global guidance (Aug 2025) naming PRC-linked firms; hunt guidance and mitigations published. National Security Agency

2) Russia: Wipers + strategic espionage

• Sandworm destructive tooling (e.g., ZEROLOT) against Ukrainian energy and European targets. We Live Security

• SVR/APT29 (Midnight Blizzard) uses identity attacks and token abuse to siphon high-value data. (See Microsoft’s guidance for responders.) Microsoft

3) Iran: Retaliatory blends of state + hacktivists

• U.S. advisory June 2025: heightened risk to U.S. firms/critical infra amid regional conflict; emphasis on edge-device exploitation. Reuters

• Predatory Sparrow operations on Iran’s Bank Sepah and crypto exchange Nobitex show cyber as strategic coercion. WIRED

4) North Korea: Financially motivated statecraft

• Bybit $1.5B breach (Feb 2025) cements crypto heists as a core funding lane for DPRK programs. Internet Crime Complaint Center

5) Spillover & neighbors

• Russian-linked activity against European critical services (e.g., Poland’s hospitals/water sector) underscores region-wide gray-zone pressure. Financial Times

Escalation & deterrence: the 2025 playbook

• Defend-forward operations: DOJ/Allies dismantle state-run botnets; publicize affidavits to shape norms. Department of Justice

• Sanctions & lawfare: target state organs, cut-outs, and contractors; some governments float ransom payment limits to starve ecosystems. Reuters+1

• Collective attributions: multination coalitions issue timely, technical alerts—useful for both hunting and geopolitics. National Security Agency

Reality check: Despite escalatory rhetoric, most campaigns stay below kinetic thresholds, avoiding mass-casualty effects while building leverage.

Defender’s field guide (enterprise & government)

Hunt what they actually do

• LOTL & valid-account abuse: prioritize identity protection, centralized logging, and anomaly hunting tuned for admin utilities & native binaries. CISA+1

• Edge devices: patch and replace EoL SOHO gear; enforce MFA and config baselines on routers/VPNs. CISA

• OT boundary: strict segmentation, unidirectional gateways where feasible; rehearse manual ops for critical processes. (See annual OT threat reviews.) Dragos Cyber Security+1

Minimum viable hardening 

• Identity: phishing-resistant MFA; conditional access; admin isolation forests; monitored break-glass.

• Exposure: inventory & close inbound from internet; broker devices via mTLS; short-lived tokens.

• Data: label & zone; encrypt in transit; block exfil to unknown SaaS; DLP on crown-jewel repos.

• Detection: hunt for PowerShell/WMI/PSExec, abnormal RDP, and cloud token reuse; alert on newly created admins out of hours.

• Response: pre-built takedown playbooks (rotate cloud secrets, invalidate tokens, disable service principals).

• Third parties: score suppliers on identity, logging, and patch SLOs; require attestation during incidents.

Case snapshots (2024–2025)

• Volt/Salt Typhoon: U.S. and allies warn of persistent access in critical infrastructure, with assessed goal to disrupt OT during crises—advice includes LOTL hunting and edge-device patching. CISA

• Joint NSA/CISA global advisory (Aug 2025): details TTPs, IOCs, and names PRC contractors supporting operations. National Security Agency

• Sandworm “ZEROLOT”: destructive wiper campaigns underscore the need for IT/OT segmentation and rehearsed failovers. We Live Security+1

• Bybit heist (DPRK): FBI pins $1.5B theft on TraderTraitor/Lazarus—a reminder that financial crime is a state lever. Internet Crime Complaint Center

• Poland CI pressure: recent reporting of Russian-linked ops on hospitals and city water infrastructures shows regional spillover risk. Financial Times

30-day hardening plan (use now)

Week 1 — Visibility: turn on cloud & identity logs; forward to SIEM; baseline admin & service principal behavior.
Week 2 — Identity: enforce phishing-resistant MFA; rotate long-lived tokens; restrict legacy protocols; per-tenant admin workstations.
Week 3 — Exposure: patch/replace edge devices; purge unused external access; enforce mTLS and client certs for device brokers.
Week 4 — Drill: run a Volt-style LOTL hunt and a Sandworm-style wiper tabletop; measure time-to-contain & token/key rotation speed.
(Use CISA’s LOTL guidance to seed detections.) CISA

FAQs

Is “cyber war” real war?
Most activity stays below armed conflict thresholds—but it shapes battlespace, intelligence, and domestic resilience.

Are attacks escalating?
Yes in persistence and breadth, not always in visible impact; pre-positioning is the trend to worry about. CISA

What about OT?
OT disruption risk is highest where IT/OT boundaries blur and incident response isn’t practiced regularly. Dragos Cyber Security

Sources and further reading

• CISA/NSA/FBI: PRC Volt Typhoon pre-positioning in U.S. critical infrastructure (Feb 2024). CISA

• NSA + 20 partners: global advisory on China-sponsored actors incl. Salt Typhoon (Aug 2025). National Security Agency

• ESET APT Activity Report (Q4’24–Q1’25): Sandworm ZEROLOT & intensifying Russian ops. We Live Security

• FBI PSA: DPRK $1.5B Bybit theft (Feb 2025). Internet Crime Complaint Center

• Waterfall & Dragos 2025 OT threat reviews (operational impacts, trends). Waterfall Security Solutions+1