Scattered Spider – Security Threat Analysis Report By CyberDudeBivash
Table of Contents
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Executive Summary
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Who is Scattered Spider
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Recent Campaigns & Trends
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Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)
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Target Profiles & Risk Sectors
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Business Impacts & Financial Risk
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Detection, Indicators, & Threat Hunting Playbook
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Mitigation & Defensive Measures
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Incident Response & Forensics
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Regulatory, Compliance & Insurance Exposure
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Recommendations & Roadmap
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Conclusion
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References & Further Reading
1. Executive Summary
Scattered Spider (aka UNC-3944, sometimes linked with ShinyHunters) is a financially-motivated cybercriminal group that has become highly active in 2024-2025. Their operations heavily rely on social engineering, help-desk impersonation, phishing (including AiTM), domain impersonation, identity / token theft, and attacks against Managed Service Providers (MSPs) & IT vendors.
They’ve expanded target sectors beyond retail & hospitality into aviation, insurance, technology, and cloud services. Their increasing ability to bypass MFA, abuse SSO, and use trusted help-desk / internal support workflows makes them a serious threat.
For organizations with weak identity controls, misconfigured help-desk authorization, poor domain monitoring or lax onboarding/baseline security, exposure is high.
This report lays out recent Scattered Spider behavior, how they operate, what organizations should look for, and what actions to take now to defend.
2. Who is Scattered Spider
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Known aliases: UNC-3944, Octo Tempest, etc. Canopius+2Picus Security+2
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Origins / formation: Active since about 2022. Initially engaged in SIM swapping, social engineering; gradually evolved to be more sophisticated in identity attacks, phishing, and targeting tech supply chains. Canopius+2Picus Security+2
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Composition: Young operators, English speaking, often using social engineering and domain impersonation. Canopius+2CrowdStrike+2
3. Recent Campaigns & Trends
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CrowdStrike noted Scattered Spider expanded from insurance & retail to aviation in Q2 2025. CrowdStrike
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Check Point Research uncovered phishing domain patterns targeting enterprises & airlines, domain impersonation tactics rising. Check Point Blog
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ReliaQuest observed domain impersonation, help-desk fraud, phishing, targeting high-value credentials in tech/finance sectors. ReliaQuest
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FS-ISAC and other sector ISACs published cross-sector threat actor analysis reports highlighting Scattered Spider’s growing risk across technology, transportation, insurance, etc. FSISAC
4. Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs)
Here are Scattered Spider’s main methods, mapped in part to MITRE ATT&CK:
Phase | Tactics / Techniques | Details |
---|---|---|
Initial Access | Phishing / Vishing / Voice Social Engineering | Impersonation of employees, help desk calls, SMS phishing. ReliaQuest+2CrowdStrike+2 |
Identity Attack | AiTM Phishing / Token Theft / SSO Abuse | Using phishing kits / proxy techniques (Evilginx-like), capturing session cookies, hijacking SSO / OAuth flows. Picus Security+2Canopius+2 |
Credential Access / MFA Bypass | Help desk impersonation to reset MFA or add unauthorized devices, SIM swapping. CrowdStrike+1 | |
Domain Impersonation Infrastructure | Typosquatting, brand impersonation, subdomain tricks, short-lived phishing domains. ReliaQuest+1 | |
Lateral Movement & Privilege Escalation | Once inside, they target MSPs or vendor relationships to pivot into client networks; steal data. ReliaQuest+2Canopius+2 | |
Persistence & Evasion | Using trusted tools, delaying detection; rotating domains; frequently changing infrastructure. Picus Security+1 |
5. Target Profiles & Risk Sectors
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Retail & Hospitality: Classic targets, visible attacks (M&S, Co-op, Harrods). The Guardian+1
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Technology / SaaS Providers / MSPs: Because compromising them gives more leverage. ReliaQuest+1
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Aviation: Emerging focus. CrowdStrike+1
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Insurance / Finance: Because of high value of data and impact. CrowdStrike+1
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Cloud / SSO Identity Providers: Weak identity or help desk practices = big play.
6. Business Impacts & Financial Risk
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Data theft / Extortion: Sensitive customer & employee data, PII, credentials.
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Operational disruptions: Resetting help desk credentials, breach containment, reputational damage.
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Ransomware risk / Affiliate relations: They may partner or feed into ransomware operators or extortion groups. Canopius+1
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Cost of remediations: Identity audits, domain monitoring, employee training, legal/regulatory costs.
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Reputation & trust damage: Loss of customer trust, especially for retail, travel, and insurance firms.
7. Detection, Indicators, & Threat Hunting Playbook
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
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Newly registered domains mimicking corporate login/SSO/help-desk.
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Phishing emails or vishing calls impersonating help desk or senior staff.
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MFA reset requests via help desk / admin tools that are socially engineered.
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Abnormal sessions from SSO or cloud services (OAuth, token reuse).
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Domain aliases / DNS lookups for typosquatted / impersonation domains.
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Unusual cloud identity provider activity, account creation or login from unfamiliar geo locations or devices.
Threat Hunting Queries / Activities
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Search logs for password/MFA reset events that follow a voice/social engineering approach.
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Monitor domain registrations with keywords related to your brand, SSO, VPN, helpdesk.
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Track login anomalies in SSO / Entra ID / Okta etc.
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Use DRP (Digital Risk Protection) tools to detect impersonation domains.
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Monitor API logs for OAuth / session token theft or unusual session cookie patterns.
8. Mitigation & Defensive Measures
Here’s what organizations should do to reduce risk from Scattered Spider.
Immediate (0–24 hours)
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Review and tighten help desk procedures: strong verification before password / MFA resets.
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Enforce MFA with hardened methods (hardware tokens, app-based MFA, avoid SMS where possible).
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Audit existing sessions / tokens; revoke suspicious ones.
Short Term (1–7 days)
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Deploy domain monitoring & DRP tools to watch for impersonation / typo domains.
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Conduct phishing / vishing awareness training, especially for help desk staff and executives.
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Harden identity providers: enforce conditional access, limit MFA resets to certain channels, enable alerts for sensitive actions.
Medium / Long Term
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Zero Trust identity model: least privilege, just-in-time access, identity governance.
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Vendor & MSP risk management: audit third-party contracts, access levels, enforce security hygiene.
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Continuous threat intel feed integration and red team simulation / phishing test.
9. Incident Response & Forensics
If an attack is suspected or confirmed:
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Containment: isolate compromised accounts; disable affected tokens/sessions; block or take offline impersonation domains.
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Investigation: forensic analysis of phishing domains; mail server logs; call recordings / ticket logs for help desk calls; SSO logs for anomalous activity.
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Remediation: reset credentials, enforce hardened MFA, rebuild or re-provision affected identity providers.
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Communication: internal reporting to technical & leadership, external disclosure if required under regulation.
10. Regulatory, Compliance & Insurance Exposure
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Data breaches involving PII may trigger GDPR, CCPA etc. obligations.
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Industry-specific regulations (financial, aviation, health) may require reporting / audits.
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Cyber insurance: policies often require evidence of reasonable security controls; failure to respond to known threat actors could affect claims.
11. Recommendations & Roadmap
Here are what I (CyberDudeBivash) recommend as strategic moves:
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Build a Scattered Spider response playbook tailored to your sectors & vendors.
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Prioritize identity & helpdesk control improvements (verifications, MFA).
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Invest in domain monitoring / DRP / brand protection services.
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Perform tabletop exercises / red team simulations focused on social engineering & credential theft.
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Monitor TTPs shifts — especially MFA bypass, AiTM phishing kits, phishing domain infrastructure.
12. Conclusion
Scattered Spider has matured into a high-risk actor: low sophistication in malware, but high effectiveness in exploiting human & identity weaknesses. Organizations can’t assume technology alone will protect them. The frontier is identity — help desk trust, domain impersonation, token security.
If you don’t have visibility into how your help desk authenticates, how your SSO / cloud identity flows are secured, or whether your employees can be convinced to reset MFA via a phone call — you are at risk.
It’s time: audit, harden, train, monitor. CyberDudeBivash stands ready to help with full fleet audits, identity assessments, phishing simulation, and building hardened SSO + DRP pipelines.
13. References & Further Reading
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US-CISA / FBI advisory on Scattered Spider activity. CISA
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CrowdStrike “SCATTERED SPIDER Escalates Attacks Across Industries.” CrowdStrike
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Check Point Research: phishing domain patterns report. Check Point Blog
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ReliaQuest blog: Scattered Spider social engineering / domain infrastructure. ReliaQuest
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FS-ISAC Threat Analysis PDF: cross-sector controls. FSISAC
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Picus Security: tracking identity attacks and token theft. Picus Security
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