EV Hacking in 2025: Real-World Risks, Regulations, and How to Secure Cars & Chargers By CyberDudeBivash • September 21, 2025 (IST)

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Executive snapshot

  • Attack reality: EVs are cyber-physical systems. Demonstrations at Pwn2Own Automotive 2025 alone yielded 49 zero-days across in-car systems and chargers—proof that the threat isn’t hypothetical. BleepingComputer

  • What’s changed: Charging networks are rapidly adopting OCPP 2.0.1 with Advanced Security (mTLS, cert lifecycle, signed firmware). Even Tesla V4 Supercharger hardware now carries an official OCPP 2.0.1 certification. Open Charge Alliance+2Open Charge Alliance+2

  • Compliance you can’t ignore: For type approval and market access, align engineering to ISO/SAE 21434 and regulatory frameworks UNECE R155 (CSMS) and R156 (software updates/OTA). NHTSA guidance remains the north star in the U.S. UNECE+2UNECE+2

  • Plug-&-Charge (PnC) goes mainstream: A universal Plug-and-Charge framework built on ISO 15118 and a Certified Trust List (CTL) is rolling out, making certificate management and revocation central to security. The Verge

The EV attack surface (car → charger → cloud → grid)

  1. In-vehicle: telematics/IVI, domain controllers, secure gateway, CAN & Automotive Ethernet, OTA.

  2. Charge path: EVSE firmware, OCPP link to the CSMS/CPMS, billing & roaming backends, local site networks.

  3. Wireless & proximity: BLE/Wi-Fi/cellular, key fob RF, service/debug ports.

  4. Grid & roaming: eMSP/CPO trust, hub-to-hub roaming, ISO 15118 PnC/V2G PKI.

Real-world disruption: the Brokenwire research showed you can wirelessly abort DC fast-charging sessions by jamming the CCS control channel—impacting fleets and sites. Design for resilience. NDSS Symposium

What’s new in 2025 

  • OCPP 2.0.1 security is the default target. It adds security profiles, client-cert/key management, secure firmware, and security event logging—and vendors are certifying at scale. Open Charge Alliance+1

  • Certification is tangible: public certs (e.g., Tesla V4 Supercharger) show mainstream adoption of Core + Advanced Security profiles in fielded hardware. Open Charge Alliance

  • PnC gets a universal trust model: SAE-led EVPKI with a CTL aims to make PnC interoperable across networks while tightening certificate hygiene and revocation. The Verge

Regulations & standards you must map to

  • UNECE R155: requires a Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS) spanning development, production, and post-production; audited for type approval in many markets. UNECE

  • UNECE R156: mandates a Software Update Management System (SUMS) and secure OTA processes throughout the vehicle life. UNECE

  • ISO/SAE 21434: engineering lifecycle standard underpinning vehicle cybersecurity (TARA, secure design, validation). Pair with R155/R156 for approvals. Vehicle Certification Agency

  • NHTSA Best Practices (2022): U.S. reference for risk-based vehicle cybersecurity (non-binding but widely followed). NHTSA

Threat patterns to design against 

1) Charger/CPMS compromise via weak OCPP

Risk: credential reuse, no client-certs, legacy profiles, lax firmware signing.
Fixes: migrate to OCPP 2.0.1 Advanced Security, enforce mTLS with charger-bound client certs, require signed firmware, and monitor security event logs; prefer certified devices. Open Charge Alliance+1

2) Wireless & PLC disruption (DC fast-charging)

Risk: Brokenwire—wireless EMI interrupts the PLC control channel; sessions abort.
Fixes: site-level RF hygiene, procedural mitigations, charge-session resilience (retry/backoff, local fallbacks), incident detection at CPMS. NDSS Symposium

3) OTA/supply-chain tampering

Risk: malicious updates, dependency hijacks, insecure flashing.
Fixes: secure boot across ECUs, signed artifacts, auditable SBOMs, staged rollouts with rollback and cryptographic provenance; map to R156 processes. UNECE

4) Plug-&-Charge PKI drift

Risk: stale trust anchors, poor revocation, non-standard provisioning.
Fixes: operate to ISO 15118 practices with a managed PKI, CTL sync, CRL/OCSP checking, automated renewals, and incident playbooks. The Verge

5) Exploit chains across components

Signal: Pwn2Own 2025 showed coordinated exploit chains against vehicles, IVI, and chargers.
Fixes: threat modeling across vehicle ↔ EVSE ↔ backend, tabletop incident drills, and patch SLAs tied to CSMS/SUMS. BleepingComputer

Reference architectures 

Vehicle (OEM/Tier-1)

  • Root of trust & secure boot per ECU; HSM/KMS-backed keys; DoIP/UDS hardening; domain-separated IVI/ADAS; SBOM per image.

Charging site (CPO)

  • OCPP 2.0.1 Advanced Security to CPMS (TLS 1.2+ + mTLS), client-cert lifecycle, signed firmware, security event streaming to SIEM; segmented LAN with no flat access to CPMS.

Backend (CPMS/eMSP/roaming)

  • Zero-trust mesh between services, HSM-backed certificate ops, PnC CTL fetch & validation, anomaly detection for mass remote commands (Start/Stop/Reset), and WAF on public APIs.

Hardening checklists

OEM / Vehicle

  •  ISO/SAE 21434 governance & TARA; R155 CSMS evidence trail. UNECE

  •  Secure boot + measured boot; anti-rollback; signed OTA mapped to R156/SUMS. UNECE

  •  ECU SBOMs; cryptographic provenance; staged rollouts/rollback.

CPO / Site Ops

  •  OCPP 2.0.1 Advanced Security; mTLS with device-bound certs; disable legacy profiles. Open Charge Alliance

  •  Signed firmware only; lock debug ports; stream security event logs centrally. Open Charge Alliance

  •  Alerts for bulk remote commands; rate limits; operator MFA/SSO for CPMS.

PnC / PKI Owners

  •  CTL synchronization + CRL/OCSP checks; automated renewal; fast revocation drill. The Verge

  •  Formal incident runbook for cert compromise; test interop at roaming hubs.

30 / 60 / 90-day action plan

Day 0–30 (Stabilize)

  • Inventory chargers & OCPP versions; turn on TLS+mTLS wherever supported; block weak ciphers.

  • Stand up CTL/CRL/OCSP checks for PnC endpoints; run a “Brokenwire-style” resilience tabletop. NDSS Symposium

Day 31–60 (Harden)

  • Migrate priority sites to OCPP 2.0.1 Advanced Security; require signed firmware; centralize logs to SIEM with rules for mass control events. Open Charge Alliance

  • Ship SBOM + provenance on charger images; enforce change-window + rollback.

Day 61–90 (Operate)

  • Complete R155/R156 gap review; attach evidence to CSMS/SUMS. UNECE+1

  • Red-team the CPMS and a representative site; drill PnC certificate revocation end-to-end. The Verge

FAQs

Is Plug-&-Charge safe?
Yes—when you maintain a healthy PKI: current CTL, proper CRL/OCSP, and tight issuance & revocation. The 2025 universal framework is designed around exactly these controls. The Verge

Do we really need OCPP 2.0.1 now?
If you run public DC fast-charging or fleets: yes. You want the Advanced Security features (mTLS, cert lifecycle, signed firmware) and vendor certification signals. Open Charge Alliance+1

Are EV hacks just conference stunts?
No—contests surface real bugs that vendors then patch. 2025’s event closed with 49 valid zero-days and vendor fixes on a 90-day clock. Treat these as design inputs. BleepingComputer

Sources

  • UNECE R155/R156 official texts & guidance (CSMS/SUMS and type-approval scope). UNECE+1

  • NHTSA Cybersecurity Best Practices (2022)—U.S. baseline guidance for vehicle cybersecurity. NHTSA

  • OCPP 2.0.1: certification program & “What’s new” (security profiles, cert mgmt, signed firmware); Tesla V4 Supercharger certification. Open Charge Alliance+2Open Charge Alliance+2

  • Brokenwire (NDSS)—wireless disruption of CCS DC fast-charging. NDSS Symposium

  • Universal Plug-&-Charge (2025 rollout)—SAE/Joint Office framework with Certified Trust List. The Verge

  • Pwn2Own Automotive 2025—49 zero-days awarded. BleepingComputer

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