DevOps Capability Deep-Dive By CyberDudeBivash

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DevOps Capability Deep-Dive 

What “good” looks like (checklist)

  • Environments: Dedicated dev/test/stage/prod with isolation, seeded data, and promotion gates; ephemeral preview envs on PRs.

  • CI/CD API: 100% API/CLI-driven deploys; no mandatory UI clicks; supports OIDC auth, approvals, and policy-as-code gates.

  • IaC/CLI: Declarative export/import of apps, configs, connections, secrets placeholders; idempotent applies; drift detection.

  • Test automation: Built-in or integrable unit/integration/E2E; headless runner; data fixtures; contract tests for connectors; coverage reports.

  • Versioning: Semantic app+schema versions, migrations (forward/back), dependency pinning, artifact provenance/signing.

  • Rollback: One-click or API rollback to a signed artifact; blue/green or canary support; reversible data migrations; automatic health checks.

Scoring rubric (0–5) with observable evidence

0 — Not supported: Single prod; manual UI deploys only.
1 — Poor: Two envs; partial export; no API approvals; no tests.
2 — Fair: Basic API deploy; brittle exports; limited tests; manual rollback.
3 — Good: Dev/test/prod; CLI+API; scripted tests; versioned artifacts; rollback to last version.
4 — Very Good: Ephemeral envs; IaC with drift detection; contract/E2E tests in CI; signed artifacts; blue/green.
5 — Excellent: Full GitOps flow; policy-as-code gates; canary + feature flags; reversible migrations; SBOM + provenance; SLO-aware automated rollback.

Score only with proof: API calls, CLI scripts, pipeline logs, and a filmed demo deploy + rollback.

Pilot validation steps (90–120 minutes)

  1. Provisioning: Create dev/test/stage/prod via API; spin preview env from a PR.

  2. Deploy (API-only): Push an app from Git with secrets injected from your vault; capture artifact ID and signature.

  3. Tests: Run unit + E2E headless against test data; fail the pipeline if a DLP policy triggers.

  4. Promote: Require two-person approval + policy gate to stage; run smoke tests post-deploy.

  5. Schema change: Apply a forward migration; verify safe backward-compat window.

  6. Rollback: Trigger blue→green rollback via API; confirm traffic cutover & auto-health checks.

  7. Drift: Manually tweak prod via UI; prove drift detection blocks the next deploy until reconciled.

Example CI pipeline (pseudo-YAML)

name: lcnc-ci
on: [pull_request, push]
jobs:
  build-test:
    permissions: { id-token: write, contents: read }
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - name: Auth (OIDC)
        run: lcnc login --oidc $OIDC_AUDIENCE
      - name: Lint & Unit Tests
        run: lcnc test --unit --report junit.xml
      - name: Package Artifact
        run: lcnc package --out app.pkg
      - name: Upload to Registry
        run: lcnc publish app.pkg --sign --provenance
  deploy-stage:
    needs: build-test
    if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
    steps:
      - name: Policy Gate
        run: conftest test policy/ --input app.pkg
      - name: Deploy (Blue)
        run: lcnc deploy app.pkg --env stage --strategy bluegreen
      - name: E2E
        run: lcnc test --e2e --env stage
      - name: Promote
        run: lcnc promote --from stage --to prod --require-approvals 2

RFP/Demo asks

  • Environments: “Create dev/test/stage/prod via API; spin a PR preview env; show data seeding & teardown.”

  • CI/CD: “Deploy from Git without UI (OIDC auth). Provide pipeline logs + artifact ID & signature.”

  • IaC: “Export app+connections as code; edit a parameter and re-apply idempotently; show drift blocking.”

  • Tests: “Run headless E2E and contract tests for a REST connector; fail on DLP policy breach.”

  • Versioning: “Show semantic version bump + schema migration with backward-compat window.”

  • Rollback: “Trigger API rollback to N-1; demonstrate blue/green cutover and auto health checks.”

Red flags 

  • UI-only promotion; no exportable config.

  • Secrets stored in app defs (not your vault).

  • One environment or shared prod tenants.

  • No policy/DLP gates; no audit trail on deploys.

  • Irreversible migrations or data loss on rollback.

Metrics to track in pilot

  • Lead time: commit→prod < 1 day (standard apps).

  • Change failure rate: < 5% (and auto-rollback within minutes).

  • Mean time to restore: < 15 min via automated rollback.

  • Test coverage: > 70% critical paths; E2E on every deploy.

  • Drift events: 0 unresolved before promotion.

#CyberDudeBivash #LowCode #NoCode #LCNC #DevOps #CICD #IaC #CLI #GitOps #TestAutomation #Versioning #Rollback #BlueGreen #CanaryReleases #PolicyAsCode #Environments #PlatformEngineering #SRE #ChangeManagement #ReleaseEngineering #Security #Governance

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