CVE-2025-10338 Explained: A Deep Dive into the Salesforce CLI Installer's Path Traversal Vulnerability
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Installers and updaters are the crown jewels of software supply chains. If an attacker can intercept or influence where an installer looks for its helper binaries, they can often force the execution of a malicious file with elevated trust. That’s exactly the risk now associated with the Salesforce CLI (Windows) installer, tracked publicly as CVE-2025-9844 — and sometimes misreported under alternate IDs and labels like “path traversal.” The verified core issue: an uncontrolled search path element that can allow a crafted file to be picked up instead of the trusted executable during installation on Windows. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}
While some coverage frames the problem as “path traversal,” authoritative advisories characterize it as a CWE-427 class flaw. The practical risk for defenders is similar: path manipulation during install can become code-execution in the wrong hands. This post explains what’s affected, the plausible attack surface, why Windows installer semantics matter, and how to harden pipelines and endpoints now.
Vulnerability Summary (What’s Actually Confirmed)
Product: Salesforce CLI for Windows (aka sf / sfdx)
CVE (verified): CVE-2025-9844
Class: CWE-427 — Uncontrolled Search Path Element
Affected: Salesforce CLI before 2.106.6 (Windows) per NVD entry. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
What goes wrong: During install/upgrade, a Windows search-path behavior allows a non-trusted executable in a preferred lookup location to be loaded instead of the legitimate helper binary. If an attacker can plant or influence that location (e.g., via writeable directories in the search order, poisoned working directory, or UNC share abuse), they can achieve arbitrary code execution under the installer’s context.
What it’s not (per verified records): Not (currently) a published path traversal CVE for the CLI installer on NVD. Several third-party blogs mention different IDs or “path traversal” wordings; we treat those as misattributions unless Salesforce/NVD updates records. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
Scope & Impact: Who’s Affected, Which Versions
- OS: Windows environments where the Salesforce CLI is installed via the official installer.
- Versions: Releases before 2.106.6 (upgrade recommended immediately). :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}
- Context: Admins/developers who install/update sf/sfdx locally; CI agents or shared jump hosts are higher risk if path hygiene is poor.
- Potential blast radius: Compromise of the developer workstation / build agent; credential theft (Salesforce org creds, OAuth tokens), tampering of pipelines, and lateral movement.
Noteworthy parallel: Salesforce advisories in 2025 also document path-traversal flaws — but in Tableau Server components (different product family). This may be fueling the terminology confusion. We note it for clarity; it’s not the CLI installer CVE. :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}
Installer Attack Surface on Windows: Why CWE-427 Hurts
On Windows, the loader’s search order (and how installers spawn child processes) can be abused if any directory in the lookup sequence is attacker-controlled or writeable. Common pitfalls include:
- Current working directory (CWD) poisoning when installers are launched from writeable paths (Downloads, network shares).
- Relative path helpers that aren’t invoked with fully qualified, signed paths.
- Insecure TEMP usage where helper binaries are staged in user-writeable locations without strict verification.
- UNC/SMB hijack where network locations get precedence due to PATH manipulation.
Any of these can shift execution to a malicious look-alike binary — the essence of CWE-427 “replace trusted executable.” The CLI installer advisory tracks exactly this risk; hence the urgent push to update to 2.106.6+ and install from trusted, clean directories. :contentReference[oaicite:6]{index=6}
“Path Traversal” vs “Search Path Hijack” — Clearing the Air
Path Traversal (CWE-22) typically means user-controlled input breaks directory constraints (e.g., ../../) to read/write files outside intended folders. Uncontrolled Search Path (CWE-427) means the program chooses the wrong binary because the search order is unsafe. These are distinct families, even if both are “path” problems. Verified records place the Salesforce CLI installer issue in the latter bucket. :contentReference[oaicite:7]{index=7}
Early Signals & Environment Red Flags
- Install/upgrade from Downloads or network shares instead of a clean, restricted folder.
- Stray DLL/EXE stubs sitting alongside installer packages with names resembling common helper binaries.
- Endpoint alerts showing unsigned child binaries spawned during CLI installation.
- CI agents that permit arbitrary PATH edits or writeable directories early in the search order.
- Devs reporting “sf/sfdx not recognized” then manual PATH tweaks — can indicate risky install locations or user fixes that introduce writeable PATH entries. :contentReference[oaicite:8]{index=8}
First 24-Hour Actions (AdSense-safe, defensive only)
- Inventory & version check: Enumerate CLI versions across Windows endpoints; flag anything below 2.106.6. :contentReference[oaicite:9]{index=9}
- Clean install location: Re-download the official installer from Salesforce’s site and run from a non-writeable admin directory (not Downloads). :contentReference[oaicite:10]{index=10}
- Lock PATH hygiene: Remove user-writeable folders from early PATH entries on developer boxes and CI hosts.
- Application control: Enforce allow-listing so only signed Salesforce binaries execute during install (block look-alikes).
- Endpoint rules: Alert on unsigned child processes spawned by installer context; quarantine suspicious events.
- Credential safety: If compromise is suspected, rotate Salesforce org tokens/keys and review OAuth grants.
Next up in Part 2: deep technical (defensive) anatomy of Windows search-path hijacks in installer contexts, CI/CD guardrails for sf/sfdx, blue-team detections (SIEM/XDR queries), and real-world playbooks — all in our CyberDudeBivash long-form format.
Technical Anatomy of Windows Installer Search-Path Hijacks
The Salesforce CLI installer flaw (verified as CVE-2025-9844, CWE-427) is part of a broader class of uncontrolled search path issues on Windows. Understanding the anatomy helps defenders recognize where exposure lurks:
- Loader Search Order: When a Windows executable calls another binary or DLL without a fully qualified path, the system searches in a defined order — often including the current working directory and PATH environment directories.
- Installer Context: Installers run with elevated privileges (often Administrator). If they pick up an attacker-planted executable first, that malicious file inherits elevated trust.
- Writeable Directories: Locations like
C:\Users\Public\,Downloads, or network-mounted folders can be exploited if included in the search sequence. - Poisoned Environment Variables: Manipulating PATH or working directory variables can redirect the installer toward malicious binaries.
- Outcome: Arbitrary code execution, credential theft, backdoor implantation — all under the guise of a legitimate installer.
This is why Salesforce explicitly patched in 2.106.6+ to fix CLI installer behavior. Lesson for defenders: Don’t just patch Salesforce CLI — assume other installer packages in your ecosystem may harbor the same CWE-427 flaw.
CI/CD & Developer Environment Implications
Salesforce CLI is widely used in DevOps, CI/CD pipelines, and local developer workstations. This multiplies the impact of installer flaws:
- Build Agents: Many CI/CD agents run automated CLI installs/upgrades in ephemeral environments. If the staging directory is attacker-controllable (e.g., a poisoned base image or shared network mount), malicious binaries can be slipped in.
- Developer Machines: Developers often install CLI from Downloads or Desktop. If a trojanized helper binary exists in those directories, the installer may load it.
- Pipeline Poisoning: Attackers compromising one CI/CD host can plant poisoned binaries to hijack future CLI upgrades across multiple builds.
- Token Exposure: Once compromised, Salesforce org credentials, OAuth tokens, and CI/CD service credentials stored on those machines are at immediate risk.
Mitigation must include both: patching to 2.106.6+ AND enforcing hygiene in CI/CD (clean directories, signed binaries, controlled PATH variables).
Blue-Team Detection & SIEM/XDR Rules
Since uncontrolled search path flaws may already be exploited pre-patch, defenders need hunt queries. Below are non-executable, defensive-only detection ideas:
- Rule 1 — Unsigned Child Executables: Alert when Salesforce CLI installer spawns a child binary that is unsigned or not signed by Salesforce.
- Rule 2 — Unusual Install Locations: Flag executions of CLI installer binaries launched from Downloads or user-writeable directories.
- Rule 3 — PATH Anomalies: Detect PATH environment variable entries pointing to world-writeable directories (e.g.,
C:\Temp\). - Rule 4 — Duplicate Helper Binaries: Hunt for DLLs/EXEs in non-standard locations with names mimicking CLI helpers.
- Rule 5 — CI/CD Image Drift: Regularly diff golden base images vs deployed agents; alert on additional binaries in PATH directories.
These detection strategies provide early warning before full compromise occurs.
Case Studies — Other Installer Vulnerabilities
CVE-2025-10338 (misattributed) isn’t the first high-profile installer issue. Parallel lessons include:
Case Study 1 — Zoom Installer Hijack (2020)
Attackers exploited Zoom’s installer on macOS to escalate privileges by dropping malicious binaries into writeable directories. Like Salesforce CLI, the root problem was uncontrolled search-path resolution.
Case Study 2 — Node.js Windows Installer (2019)
Older Node.js Windows installers looked in current directories for DLLs. Attackers demonstrated hijacks that delivered backdoors into developer environments.
Case Study 3 — Tableau Server Path Traversal (2025)
Unlike CLI, Tableau Server advisories document genuine path traversal flaws. Confusion between these and CLI’s CWE-427 issue likely fueled CVE misattribution.
Takeaway: Installer trust boundaries remain weak points across ecosystems. Salesforce’s patch is just one battle in a larger war.
Next up in Part 3: the full CyberDudeBivash SOC playbook for Salesforce CLI installer risks, enterprise mitigation checklists, extended FAQ, CTA section with CyberDudeBivash services, and JSON-LD schema for SEO.
SOC Playbook — Responding to Salesforce CLI Installer Vulnerabilities
When Salesforce CLI installer flaws (CWE-427 uncontrolled search path) surface, SOCs must act quickly. Here’s the CyberDudeBivash playbook:
Step 1 — Detection
- Log Salesforce CLI installer executions; flag child processes that are unsigned or not Salesforce-signed.
- Ingest file integrity monitoring alerts showing duplicate helper binaries in installer directories.
- Correlate installs from Downloads or user-writeable paths — treat as high-risk.
Step 2 — Triage
- Scope: Identify all endpoints running CLI versions older than 2.106.6.
- Impact: Assess whether attacker-controlled files were present during installation.
Step 3 — Containment
- Quarantine machines showing suspicious installer behavior.
- Block PATH entries that point to writeable or network-shared directories.
Step 4 — Eradication
- Uninstall compromised CLI instances; reinstall 2.106.6+ from clean, verified directories.
- Delete rogue binaries in Downloads, TEMP, or PATH directories.
Step 5 — Recovery
- Re-image CI/CD agents if tampering suspected.
- Rotate Salesforce org OAuth tokens and credentials used by affected machines.
- Review logs for anomalous CLI activity in Salesforce orgs.
Step 6 — Lessons Learned
- Update procurement: require secure installer design in vendor SLAs.
- Add search-path hijack detection rules into SIEM baseline.
Enterprise Mitigation Checklist
- Upgrade: Ensure all Salesforce CLI instances are updated to
2.106.6+. - Installer Hygiene: Mandate installs from restricted directories, not Downloads or network shares.
- PATH Policy: Remove user-writeable directories from PATH in enterprise baselines.
- App Control: Deploy allow-listing (only Salesforce-signed binaries).
- CI/CD Safeguards: Validate base images and ban PATH modifications in build scripts.
- Threat Hunts: Periodically scan for duplicate helper binaries in non-standard locations.
- Training: Educate DevOps teams about installer hijack risks.
FAQ — CVE-2025-10338 / Salesforce CLI Installer
Q1. Is CVE-2025-10338 the same as CVE-2025-9844?
Authoritative NVD records list the CLI Windows installer flaw as CVE-2025-9844 (CWE-427). Some third-party reports label it CVE-2025-10338 or “path traversal.” Treat these as aliases or misattributions.
Q2. What versions are impacted?
Salesforce CLI before 2.106.6 on Windows. Upgrade immediately.
Q3. Is this a path traversal vulnerability?
No. Verified advisories classify it as an uncontrolled search path element (CWE-427), not CWE-22 path traversal.
Q4. How can enterprises protect CI/CD pipelines?
Lock PATH variables, enforce clean install directories, scan base images, and monitor for rogue binaries in build agents.
Q5. What’s the blast radius if exploited?
Potential arbitrary code execution on developer machines or CI/CD hosts, leading to credential theft, pipeline compromise, and lateral movement into Salesforce orgs.
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