CVE-2025-68154 : Critical 10.0 RCE in Node.js Hijacks Windows Systems (The Mandatory Patch & Secret Rotation Guide).
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Zero-days, exploit breakdowns, IOCs, detection rules & mitigation playbooks.
- What it is: OS command injection in systeminformation (npm) on Windows, through fsSize() where the optional drive parameter is concatenated into a PowerShell command without sanitization.
- Affected: systeminformation 5.27.14 (Windows only).
- Fixed: systeminformation 5.27.14.
- Reality check: Not a Node.js runtime bug; it’s a dependency issue. Exploitability depends on whether user input reaches fsSize().
- Patch now: upgrade dependency, rebuild, redeploy. Verify shipped artifact actually includes 5.27.14.
- Rotate secrets: if the service was internet-facing or logs suggest suspicious requests, assume potential code execution and rotate tokens/keys/credentials immediately.
- What CVE-2025-68154 is (and what it is not)
- Impact on Windows: how “hijack” happens in practice
- Who is affected and how to confirm exposure safely
- Mandatory patch guide (fast and correct)
- Mandatory secret rotation guide (assume breach rules)
- Detections and monitoring (defender-friendly)
- Incident response checklist + 30-60-90 plan
- FAQ
- References
1) What CVE-2025-68154 is (and what it is not)
CVE-2025-68154 is an OS command injection vulnerability in the npm package systeminformation, a Node.js library used to collect system and OS metrics. The vulnerable code path is in fsSize(). According to public advisories, the optional drive parameter is concatenated into a PowerShell command without sanitization, allowing arbitrary command execution on Windows if attacker-controlled input reaches that parameter.
This is not a Node.js runtime / core vulnerability. It is a dependency-level issue (supply-chain risk). That distinction matters operationally: many engineering teams patch “Node.js version” and still remain exposed if the application bundle still ships a vulnerable systeminformation version.
2) Impact on Windows: how “hijack” happens in practice
“Hijack” is not magic. It is simply what happens when an attacker reaches remote code execution on a server: they can run commands, stage tooling, steal credentials, create persistence, and move laterally. If your Node.js service runs under a privileged account, the attacker inherits those privileges.
The most common real-world blast radius is not limited to one application. Once code execution lands on a Windows server, attackers frequently pivot into: environment variables, build artifacts, app configs, service account tokens, database credentials, and cloud keys. That is why this guide includes secret rotation as mandatory when exposure is credible.
3) Who is affected and how to confirm exposure safely
Public advisories state the following facts: systeminformation versions prior to 5.27.14 are affected, the issue is Windows only, and version 5.27.14 contains a patch. Exploitability depends on whether the application passes user-controlled input into fsSize().
4) Mandatory patch guide (fast and correct)
Your patch goal is simple: ensure production runs systeminformation 5.27.14 or later, and that no old version is bundled inside containers, zip deployments, or build artifacts. Many incidents happen because teams patch “source” but deploy an “old artifact.”
- Update dependency: set systeminformation to 5.27.14 (or newer) in package.json / lockfile.
- Clean build: remove node_modules and perform a clean install and rebuild (avoid hidden old transitive copies).
- Redeploy: roll out through normal change control, but treat as urgent for internet-facing services.
- Verify artifact: confirm the running service actually has systeminformation 5.27.14 (SBOM, npm ls in build pipeline, or artifact inspection).
- Regression test: validate any endpoints that collect system metrics and ensure behavior matches expected functionality.
5) Mandatory secret rotation guide (assume breach rules)
If the vulnerable app was reachable by untrusted users, or if you cannot prove it was unreachable, rotate secrets as if the server may have been executed remotely. This is not paranoia; it is a standard containment principle: RCE plus time equals credential compromise.
- Application secrets: JWT signing keys, session secrets, encryption keys, webhook secrets.
- Database credentials: DB users/passwords, connection strings, read/write accounts (rotate and reduce privilege).
- Cloud credentials: access keys, service principals, workload identities, deployment tokens.
- CI/CD tokens: Git tokens, artifact registry tokens, package publish tokens.
- Third-party API keys: payment, email, SMS, analytics, monitoring, support tools.
- Windows service account credentials: rotate service identities and remove local admin if not required.
6) Detections and monitoring (defender-friendly)
Because this is a command injection scenario, your best detection strategy is layered: web access anomalies, unusual process creation from Node.js, and abnormal outbound connections. Forward logs off-host (SIEM) so a compromised server cannot erase evidence.
- Unusual traffic spikes to endpoints that call system metrics functions (especially disk-related calls)
- Child processes spawned by the Node.js process (PowerShell, cmd.exe) outside maintenance windows
- Unexpected outbound connections from the application server (direct-to-IP, rare DNS, new domains)
- Unexpected file writes in application directories and startup/persistence locations
- Credential access attempts: reads of config files, env dumps, vault clients launched from app context
7) Incident response checklist + 30-60-90 plan
- Contain: restrict inbound access to trusted networks/VPN only; isolate the server if suspicious behavior is present.
- Preserve evidence: export logs, capture relevant telemetry, and snapshot per IR policy.
- Patch: deploy systeminformation 5.27.14 and verify the running artifact includes the fix.
- Rotate secrets: follow the rotation priority list above; revoke old credentials explicitly.
- Hunt: search for persistence (services, scheduled tasks), suspicious binaries, and new admin accounts.
- Recover: rebuild from known-good images if integrity is uncertain.
- Patch all affected services and verify artifacts
- Implement SBOM/CI gate to block vulnerable versions
- Improve logging + process telemetry on Windows servers
- Remove direct user influence over system-metrics inputs
- Reduce service privileges and harden PowerShell policy baseline
- Add egress controls and anomaly detection for app servers
- Formalize “dependency emergency patch” SOP
- Quarterly secrets rotation rehearsal for critical systems
- Tabletop drill: “Windows server RCE via npm dependency”


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